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Airline Networks 
AIRLINE NETWORKS: 
A COMPARISON OF HUB-AND-SPOKE AND POINT-TO-POINT SYSTEMS 
Gerald N. Cook and Jeremy Goodwin 
Abstract 
The disparity between the relative success of low-cost and network carriers since 2001 has often been 
attributed to the difference in route system architecture. This paper compares the economic and operational 
characteristics of point-to-point and hub-and-spoke route systems. It also argues that the emphasis placed on route 
structure obscures other differences in business models. Although U.S. low-cost-carriers are frequently characterized 
as operating point-to-point systems, few actually do so. As network airlines simplify their domestic products and the 
low-cost-carriers diversify theirs, the distinction between the two is rapidly fading. 
Introduction 
The relative success and continued growth oflow-
cost-carriers over the last six years contrasts sharply with the 
deep financial crisis and huge losses sustained by larger 
network carriers. This disparity has received attention in 
both the academic and popular press with many writers 
attributing the disparate fates to differences in route 
structure. Indeed, the terms low-cost-carrier (LCC) and 
point-to-point carrier are often used interchangeably. This 
indiscriminate terminology obscures the fact that most US 
LCCs do not employ point-to-point route architectures. 
Certainly the prototypical LCC Southwest Airlines is an 
example of a predominately point-to-point airline; but 
AirTran and Frontier, for example, operate classic hub-and-
spoke (H&S) route systems. H&S, or network, carriers 
American and United, on the other hand, offer nearly hourly 
non-stop service from New York to Los Angeles overflying 
their mid-continent hubs. 
While route structure is a critical strategic choice, 
it is only one element of an airline business model and is 
rarely deployed in pure form. The failure to distinguish 
between many other aspects of the business model and route 
structure obscures important aspects of both. This paper 
seeks to clarify the contribution of route architecture to 
competitive advantage by contrasting the economics and 
operations ofH&S with point-to-point route systems. While 
interest in this discussion would usually be limited to airline 
and transportation economists, the relative success and 
prospects of airlines is a common topic for all aviation 
professionals. The strategic role of route architecture 
JAAER, Winter 2008 
provides a foundation for all such discourse. 
History 
Prior to U.S. airline deregulation in 1978, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) awarded airline operating 
certificates, allocated routes, and dictated ticket prices. Early 
air routes followed the railroad lines connecting large cities 
along a mostly linear structure. After World War II, the 
CAB certified smaller, so-called local service airlines, to 
provide connecting service from smaller cities previously 
without air service to large cities served by the established 
trunk airlines. Geographical coverage expanded, but 
required connections were often poorly coordinated, 
inconvenient, and usually involved one or more changes of 
airlines. 
While attempting to balance the congressional 
mandate to encourage competition but avoid destructive 
practices, the CAB allowed little route competition with 
monopoly and duopoly common. With ticket prices set on 
a mileage-based formula, competition focused instead on 
product attributes. Although linear route systems 
predominated in the regulated era, some airlines gradually 
developed limited connecting routes. Notable are Delta and 
Eastern in Atlanta, United in Chicago, American in Dallas, 
and Allegheny in Pittsburgh (Button, 2002a). 
An oil embargo, recession, and the rapid 
introduction of new widebody aircraft in the early 1970's 
resulted in plummeting loads and large losses by mid-
decade. Pointing to the success of unregulated, profitable, 
intrastate airlines in California and Texas offering simple 
service at low prices, some academics and policy makers 
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began arguing that industry regulation no longer served the 
public interest. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 freed 
airlines from 40 years of economic regulation (Cook, 1996). 
Deregulation proponents anticipated the industry 
would evolve to a nation-wide linear and point-to-point 
route system with low, simple fares much as intrastate 
carriers Pacific Southwest in California and Southwest in 
Texas had pioneered (Bailey & Liu, 1995}. Instead, through 
growth, merger ·and acquisition, the former trunk carriers 
moved quickly to develop H&S route systems in an attempt 
to capture the passenger from origin to destination. Many 
new airlines did enter service with the low-fares and point-
to-point route systems as anticipated; but, in another 
surprise, nearly all failed. To be sure, failures also included 
some venerable old-line trunk carriers such as Eastern, Pan 
American, and Branift; but those trunk airlines that buih 
H&S networks and survived the early shake-out seemed 
destined to dominate the industry (Borenstein. 1992}. Only 
Southwest Airlines, expanding slowly and steadily out of its 
Texas base, seemed to challenge the supremacy ofthe H&S 
concept Southwest's low fares, frequent flights, and no 
ftills service largely defined the low-cost airline business 
model. 
Though the significance was unrecognized at the 
time, the acceptance of ticket-less travel and Internet 
distribution beginning in the mid-1990s was the catalysts for 
dramatic industry reorganization that the dotcom bubble 





Since 2001, the largest airlines. now somewhat derisively 
labeled legacy carriers, have suffered losses of more than 40 
billion dollars. Four of the six largest airlines entered 
bankruptcy with American avoiding the fate only by an 
eleventh hour concessionary agreement ftom its pilots. 
Meanwhile, Southwest was joined by JetBlue and a few 
other LCCs in a steady, if uneven, expansion. The contrast 
between these successful LCCs and the financial woes of 
the legacy carriers bas frequently been ascn"bed to 
differences in route structure, prompting industry analysts. 
academic economists, and the popular press alike to 
declared the H&S system. if not dead, then, seriously 
wounded (Legacy Carrier Challenge, 2004; McDonald, 
2002; Tretheway, 2004}. 
Comparison of Hub and Spoke and Point-to-Point 
Route Systems 
Route architecture choice is the foundation of an 
airline's product Point-to-point and H&:S architectures lie 
at the poles of a continuum with most large airlines 
operating some combination of the two. For clarity, 
however, each is discussed in its pure form as depicted in 
Figure 1. All passengers in a pure point-to-point system 
board at flight origin and deplane at the destination. In the 
hub and spoke system, by contrast, all passengers except 
those whose origin or destination is the bub, transfer at the 
hub for a second flight to their destination. Each has 
advantages best suited for certain markets which make an 
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Figure 1: Point-to-Point and Hub & Spoke Architecture 
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Hub and Spoke Architecture 
The H&S route system became the post-
deregulation standard for a variety of reasons. The system is 
optimized when providing air service to a wide geographic 
area and many destinations. Passengers departing from any 
non-hub (spoke) city bound to another spoke in the network 
are first flown to the hub where they connect to a second 
flight to the destination. Thus passengers can travel between 
any two cities in the route system with one connecting stop 
at the hub, or, as one author described it, "from anywhere to 
everywhere" (Hansson, Ringbeck, & Franke, 2002, p. 1.)1• 
Inbound and outbound flights are tightly timed and 
coordinated to minimize connection time (McShan & 
Windle, 1989). 
The H&S system serves network destinations with 
the fewest routes of any alternative design. For example, 
five destinations require only four routes with one hub and 
four spoke cities but ten routes are required if the same 
destinations are connected with a point-to-point system. 
Consequently, for any given level of frequency and number 
of destinations, the H&S system requires the fewest number 
of aircraft (Button, 2002b). With the price of mainline 
commercial aircraft ranging upwards of$35 million dollars, 
this is a major consideration for any airline. 
Large post-deregulation carriers were quick to 
realize the competitive advantages of expansion to more 
destinations and coverage area. Expansion encourages 
travel, increases connectivity, and improves asset utilization 
(Gillen & Morrison, 2005). Following deregulation, the 
large airlines moved to quickly transfonn their route 
structures through growth, acquisition and merger. 
Anywhere to everywhere. 
The advantages of the H&S system derive from 
consolidating the travel demand of each spoke city to most 
or all of the destinations in the network. Economic 
advantages increase with passenger density and network 
growth, positively affecting both supply and demand. 
Passengers prefer to use a single airline for their entire 
journey, so the ability to serve many cities of varying sizes 
confers a competitive advantage. Passengers making hub 
connections benefit from closely timed flights, single check-
in, more convenient gate and facility locations, and reduced 
risk of lost baggage. Knowing that an airline likely serves a 
desired destination saves the passenger search and 
transaction costs. Familiarity with the airline's product 
lessens uncertainties and increases loyalty, particularly when 
linked to loyalty programs. 
1 Some itineraries in multi-hub systems require passenger 
connections at two hubs. 
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As destinations in the network grow and more 
passengers funnel through the hub, flight frequency can be 
increased. High frequency allows the passenger to match 
flights with desired itinerary times (Gillen & Morrison, 
2005); major network carriers operate ten or more 
connecting complexes per day. Increases in both number of 
destinations served and frequency also provides a bigger 
base over which to spread advertising and promotional 
expenses. A single advertisement promotes 50 destinations 
instead of just a few. Frequent flier programs gain utility and 
efficacy. 
On the supply side, seat mile costs benefit from 
economies of traffic density. Larger aircraft can be utilized 
as the number of passengers per route increase; and, because 
seating capacity increases faster than operating and capital 
cost with aircraft size, seat mile costs decline. These savings 
allow for lower fares and/or increased margin. ~ 
economies of density and scope2 also encouraged network 
growth. Adding a city to the network requires only one 
additional route, utilizes many of the existing hub facilities, 
but potentially provides new service to every city in the 
netwofkl. With more destinations, smaller, lower demand 
cities can be added that a network with fewer destinations 
would not support. To the extent that demand patterns of 
city-pairs within the network are not highly correlated, total 
demand is smoothed allowing better capacity utilization. For 
exainple, the summer peak east-west travel offsets a 
seasonal decline to winter destinations. Large 
network carriers dominate operations at one or more hub 
cities. With domination comes a degree of market power 
enabling the carrier to extract a fare premium on flights to 
and from the hub (Borenstein, 1989; US Department of 
Transportation, 2001 ). Additionally, domination provides a 
means to exclude new competition through control of 
facilities and aggressively competitive or even predatory 
practices (Oster, 2001). 
Network growth marked the first twenty years 
following deregulation in a seemingly virtuous cycle of 
more destinations, passengers, and revenue. Each airline 
sought to connect all major domestic markets over one or 
more hubs. Later development of domestic H&S networks 
2 Economies of density develop when average unit cost 
declines as more traffic is carried Economies of scope 
arise when two or more products can be produced more 
cheaply together than separately. 
3 Some city~pairs are not practical because the distance 
from spoke to hub to spoke is much greater than the direct 
distance between the spokes, leading to unacceptable 
total travel time. 
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was aided by the introduction of the regional jet in the early 
1990s which provided access to destinations previously too 
distant for turboprop aircraft or too thin for mainline jets 
(Feldman, 2000). Hub growth, however, does not come 
without operational cost. 
Cost and complexity. 
Although the advantages of the H&S system in 
gathering and dispersing passengers are many, the costs of 
operating the system are high. In the last ten years, the limits 
of the H&S model have become particularly evident, and, in 
a reversal of earlier predictions, the foundations of the 
model have been questioned (McDonald. 2002). Typically 
about 40% of all network carrier passengers have the hub as 
their origin or destination. The remainder only passes 
through the hub(s) to make outbound connections. Extensive 
facilities and substantial personnel are needed solely to 
accommodate these connecting passengers. The passenger 
service agents, gates, lounges, baggage facilities, ramp and 
maintenance personnel dedicated to passenger connections 
are not necessary if tlights operate non-stop between 
passengers' origin and destination (Donoghue, 2002). 
Obviously, the intervening stop at the hub requires an 
additional takeoff and landing incurring landing fees and 
facility charges. 
Route system geography also drives higher cost. 
The hub can be directly inline with only a few origin-
destination markets. All other passenger itineraries require 
circuitous routing to the hub lengthening total flight time 
with attendant increase in cost. Each of the two flight 
segments connecting a passenger's origin and destination 
are shorter than a single non-stop segment. Per mile, short 
flight segments are more expensive to operate (Swan, 2002). 
Aircraft achieve lower block speeds due to additional taxi 
times and maneuvering for takeoff and landing. More flight 
time spent at lower altitudes increases fuel burn. Flight crew 
pay based on block time is higher as is maintenance expense 
because many costs are driven by flight cycle rather than 
flight time (Halloway, 2003). 
Less obvious is the effect on utilization of spoke 
cities at varying distances from the hub. In order to meet the 
timing of next inbound bank, aircraft operating to the closer 
spokes must await the return of aircraft from the most 
distance cities. These schedule-imposed delays reduce 
aircraft and flight crew utilization. Scheduling techniques, 
particularly for carriers operating many connecting 
complexes, can mitigate poor utilization, but limits remain. 
At the hub, personnel and facilities are fully utilized during 
each connecting complex but lie mostly idle at other times. 
Asset utilization is correspondingly reduced (Berdy, 2002). 
At a point which depends largely on the hub airport 
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capacity, network growth leads to rapidly escalating costs. 
The most obvious cause is schedule imposed hub 
congestion. Flight delays increase as the airport nears 
capacity. Arrivals and departures are limited by available 
runways. Inclement weather requires greater aircraft 
spacing, particularly for landing. Arrival rates are reduced -
halved at some airports - when weather permits only 
instrument approaches. Taxiways and gates become 
crowded. Terminal space, especially in older terminals, is 
taxed. Essentially, the hub carrier creates its own traffic 
congestion by scheduling ever more flights into each 
complex. Between connecting complexes, however, the 
airport may be almost empty (Franke, 2004). Airlines 
generally make allowance for congestion by increasing 
flight and connecting times, further eroding asset utilization. 
The H&S system lends itself to service of cities of 
greatly varying size and demand. so different aircraft models 
are needed to match capacity with traffic. The fleet of a 
large network carrier typically consists of aircraft with 
seating capacities ranging from 50 to 350 or more. As fleet 
commonality decreases, costs increase to train pilots and 
mechanics, inventory varied parts, and acquire and maintain 
fleet-specific support equipment. Aircraft and crew 
scheduling is more difficult and constrained as fleet 
complexity increases. Learning curves are more slowly 
exploited. These factors make the planning and management 
of network carriers extremely complex. Indeed, 
management scientists have long concentrated efforts in 
solving airline applications. 
Finally, H&S systems are highly susceptible to 
delays. A delay on one or a few inbound flights can spread 
as outbound flights are held for connecting passengers. 
Disruptions which affect the entire hub, particularly weather 
but also radar or computer outages, often propagate rapidly 
through the entire flight operation. Multiple hubs provide 
some opportunity for mitigation. 
Full service and premium pricing. 
Although effective in providing air service to 
varied and dispersed markets, H&S 
networks are complex and costly to operate. To earn a 
profit, network carriers have attempted to maximize 
revenues by offering a full-array of services. The high 
frequency and geographical scope of a network system are 
particularly valuable to business travelers. In return for full 
service, especially ticketing flexibility and seat inventory 
reserved for late-booking, business travelers have paid a fare 
premium (Lott, 2006). Excess capacity arising from the 
inability to match capacity with large variance in demand is 
offered at a substantial discount to leisure travelers. 
Sophisticated revenue management systems developed over 
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many years exploit travelers' differing willingness and 
ability to pay for air travel, maximizing network revenue. 
Particularly in the late 1990's as network airline labor costs 
increased rapidly, business fares rose steadily often 
exceeding discount fares by a factor of ten or more. 
Business travelers' anger at these disparities is one factor in 
the traumatic restructuring of legacy carriers in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century (Hansson, 2002). 
Point-to-Point Architecture 
The counterpoint to the complexity of the H&S 
system is the simplicity of point-to-point architecture which 
connects each origin and destination via a non-stop flight. A 
non-stop flight is the least expensive means to serve markets 
where demand is sufficient to support larger, mainline 
aircraft. Eliminating the intermediate stop at the connecting 
hub provides an average savings of more than 30% (Lott, 
2005b). As compelling as this savings is, the point-to-point 
system offers other benefits as well. 
F astand cheap. 
Point-to-point flights reduce total travel time, 
primarily by eliminating the intermediate stop, but also by 
avoiding circuitous routings and increasing aircraft block 
speeds. Passengers value the reduction in travel time. 
Without the schedule constraint of connecting complexes, 
aircraft tum times can be minimiud. Aircraft can be utilized 
more fully creating an opportunity to generate more 
revenue. Gates can accommodate more operations per day. 
Airport personnel can be utilized fully throughout the day. 
Flight crew utilization may also increase; however, the lack 
of connecting flights can also complicate crew scheduling, 
especially in low frequency systems. 
Limited to largest markets. 
The inability to consolidate traffic bound for many 
destinations on a single flight severely limits the number of 
city-pairs in which non-stop flights can be economically 
operated. Most small and mid-sized cities have insufficient 
demand to support non-stop flights to more than a few, if 
JAAER. Winter 2008 
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any, destinations. Of the more than 400 US domestic 
airports with commercial service, less than 20% generate 
more than 50 directional passengers per day (Lott & Taylor, 
2004). By one estimate, only 5% of domestic city-pairs 
generate sufficient traffic to support non-stop service. These 
are also the biggest domestic markets, accounting for about 
75% of all traffic and, consequently, draw intense 
competition (Lott, 2003). Airlines increasingly compete on 
the basis of price, especially in markets with an LCC 
presence, so yields in large markets are low (Lott, 2006). 
There are few, if any, opportunities remaining for LCCs to 
enter overpriced and underserved markets. To continue 
expansion, LCCs are forced into competition with each 
other rather than only with legacy carriers. 
Low density markets might be served with smaller 
aircraft. One role envisioned for the regional jet was in hub 
bypass. Seat-mile costs for the regional jets, however, are 
more than twice that of LCCs operating mainline jets, 
usually the Boeing 737 or Airbus 320 series. The fares 
required to cover the operating costs of the regional jet are 
too high to stimulate traffic for expanded point-to-point 
service. Consequently, the role ofthe regional jet has been 
almost exclusively as a hub feeder to H&S carriers (Savage 
& Scott, 2004). The recent failure oflndependence Air is an 
instructive example of an attempt to operate outside of this 
feeder role. 
Finally, demand varies significantly by time of day, 
week, and season making it difficult for an airline to match 
capacity with demand. Air travel demand in various city-
pairs is highly correlated, but the network carrier has some 
ability to off-set a drop in demand in one or more city-pairs 
with higher demand in others. Without connecting traffic, 
the point-to-point carrier has no such ability to balance 
route-specific demand variations; rather, it is left to changes 
in frequency, aircraft size, or seasonal routes in attempting 
to match capacity and demand. 
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Summary 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the two route systems: 
Attribute Hub and Spoke Point-to-Point 
Scope Optimized by connecting service Each route serves a single city-
to wide geographical area and pair. Individual routes may be 
many destinations dis~. 
Connectivity Most passengers connect at No connections provided 
hub(s) for a continuing flight(s) (although incidental or "rolling 
to destination hub" connections are common) 
Dependence Each route highly dependent on Routes operate independently, 
other routes for connecting traffic is not affected by demand 
passengers from other routes 
Demand Varying demand in any given Only varying frequency and 
city-pair may be offset by pricing available to counter 
demand from other markets demand variance 
Market Size Efficiently serves cities of greatly Requires high density markets 
varying size with at least one end-point being 
a high demand origin/destination 
Frequency Supports high daily :frequency to Generally lower frequency 
all destinations depending on market type and 
densi.ty 
Pricing Frequency and coverage appeal to Both business and leisure 
business travelers providing a passengers are generally price-
mare;in for higher business fares seeking 
Asset Utilization Limited by network geography, No network constraints on 
connection timing, and hub utilization 
congestion 
Cost of Operation Hub connections significantly Lowest cost per available seat 
· increase cost per available seat mile per city-pair 
mile, somewhat offset by use of 
lar_g_er mainline aircraft 
Fleet Requirement Large range in seating capacity is Suited to a single fleet type 
necessary to match capacity with 
traffic, usually requires more than 
one fleet~ 
Table 1: Characteristics ofHub-and-Spoke and Point-to-Point Route Systems 
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Hybrid Systems Common 
There are, of course, hybrid and combination routes 
systems lying between these poles. Even Southwest's 
system is more accurately described as linear (Button, 2002; 
Lederer & Mambinadom, 1998). Similar to a bus or train 
system, on a linear system, an aircraft makes several stops 
enroute between an origin and destination collecting and 
disembarking passengers at each stop. Southwest Airlines 
also has enough flights at its focus cities that de facto 
connections are widely available but not always well-timed 
Thus, the linear system combines aspects of both point-to-
point and H&S architecture. All network carriers operate 
point-to-point flights in large markets by-passing their own 
hubs. JetBlue's interesting route system combines elements 
of the H&S, point-to-point, and linear. These variants of 
route system architecture are common, but the distinction is 
rarely drawn. 
Post 2001 Developments 
Early post-deregulation developmentofH&S route 
systems included spokes to distant major cities, but much of 
each airline's network growth remained geographically 
concentrated near the carrier's home. Growth by acquisition 
and merger frequently eliminated what competition had 
previously existed (Borenstein, 1992). But inevitably, later 
expansion included cities already served by other carriers 
over their hubs. Airlines fought for market share while 
passengers enjoyed more and cheaper alternatives. By 2000, 
fourteen Midwest hubs competed for east-west travel 
(Capped hubs, 2001) creating intense competition for 
connecting, usually low-yield, traffic. 
Competition from expanding LCCs, growth of 
Internet distribution, the emergence of ticket-less travel, the 
drop in demand following the Internet bubble burst, and, 
most acutely, the downturn following 9/11 all forced a 
dramatic legacy carrier restructuring over the last five years. 
Four carriers resorted to bankruptcy to reduce costs and 
increase efficiency while American and Continental were 
able to do so without court intervention. Common steps 
taken by each carrier include reduction in labor costs from 
concessionary agreements with labor unions or imposition 
where employees were not represented; retirement of older, 
less efficient aircraft; renegotiation of aircraft leases; 
reduction in product attributes such as meal and inflight 
services; and an increase in operational efficiencies, notably 
the implementation of''rolling hubs." Delta, United, and 
US Airways terminated their traditional defined benefit 
pension plans while in bankruptcy leaving the liability to the 
JAAER, Winter 2008 
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Pension Benefit Gwirantee Corporation and the taxpayer. 
The result is a legacy carrier group far more cost 
competitive with LCCs. Legacy labor cost per available seat 
mile, for example, has fallen from 4.4 cents in 2000 to 3.5 
cents by the third quarter of 2005. This compares with 2.8 
cents for the LCCs (Meehan, 2006). Cost improvements as 
Delta and Northwest work through bankruptcy will likely 
narrow this gap further. 
Legacy carriers increased operational efficiencies 
in many ways, but one method is especially applicable to a 
discussion of route systems. Convenient and timely flight 
connections result from tightly scheduled complexes but 
come at the expense of poor asset utilization. American was 
the first to implement "depeaking" or the "rolling hub" at its 
Chicago O'Hare hub. Rather than closely timed arriving and 
departing banks, with a rolling hub flights are scheduled into 
and out of the hub evenly throughout the day (Flint, 2002). 
Because of the volume of flights, connections to all spokes 
are still available but connection times vary. American 
concluded the average passenger total trip time increased by 
10 minutes but its 330 daily flights required 5 fewer aircraft 
and 4 less gates. Employee productivity was up 4 to 5% 
(Gillen & Morrison, 2005). Mean tum-times decreased by 
5 minutes at O'Hare and 8 minutes at the spokes (Flint, 
2002). Subsequently, American depeaked its Dallas and 
Miami hubs, as did Delta at Atlanta. 
Legacy carriers have also realized, perhaps 
somewhat belatedly, that large and increasing price 
premiums extracted from business travelers in the late 1990s 
are no longer sustainable. Delta's introduction of 
Simplifares in January 2005 was generally followed by the 
other legacy carriers. At the time, domestic one-way coach 
fares were capped at $499 dollars, far below the previous 
unrestricted walk-up fares which frequently exceeded 
$1,000 (Lott, 2005a). The $499 cap was still higher than the 
typical LCC top fare of$299, but illustrates the necessity to 
compete for business travelers with competitive fares. Faced 
with higher fuel costs, both legacy and LCC raised the self-
imposed fare caps in 2006. 
Instead of following a simple business model 
traditionally attributed to LCCs, these carriers now 
differentiate their products in many ways. JetBlue raised the 
bar for in-flight service by providing free television. Most 
carriers, with the notable exception of Southwest, offer 
advanced seat assignment1• AirTran and Spirit have a 
premium or business class cabin. Service to secondary 
airports, long cited as a distinctive difference between LCCs 
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and legacy carriers, is less widely utilized. JetBlue's home 
base is New York Kennedy with Boston Logan as another 
focus city, AirTran operates from Atlanta, and Frontier's 
hub is Denver. Southwest still favors secondary airports but 
also operates from many primary airports. Recently, it began 
flying from the primary airports at Denver, Philadelphia, and 
Pittsburgh. But LCCs are perhaps best known as point-to-
point carriers. While this haS always been an exaggeration, 
it is becoming even less true. AirTran, America West (pre-
merger), and Frontier are predominately H&S carriers. The 
smallest of the LCCs, Spirit Airlines, was the best example 
of a pure point-to-point carrier. Over the last year, however, 
it has rapidly transformed its system into a H&S with 
Midwest and Northeast flights connecting to the Caribbean 
through Ft. Lauderdale. Southwest's flight schedule is not 
built specifically to produce connections, but connections 
arise because of the volume of flights at many cities. These 
de facto connections were termed rolling hubs before 
American first began "depeaking" its Chicago O'Hare hub. 
Conclusion 
The cost advantage once provided to LCCs by a 
simple point-to-point route system and product has 
significantly diminished. Through restructuring, legacy 
carriers increased efficiencies and lower labor costs. 
LCCs identified and exploited underserved and overpriced 
markets some years ago and now find themselves 
increasingly competing with both learner legacy carriers 
and other LCCs. In search of a sustainable advantage, 
they have ventured far from the early Southwest low-cost 
model introducing a variety of products. Consequently, 
the distinction between LCCs and legacy carriers is 
fading. If the new US Airways, which bills itself as the 
first nationwide low-cost-carrier is included, the 
distinction vanishes. Instead, the U.S. landscape now 
contains a continuum of service-price offerings with each 
carrier attempting to apply its strengths to one or more 
passenger segments. Although this variety of product 
offerings is consistent with marketing theory, it introduces 
a new complexity for observers and students of the airline 
industry. 
Despite the importance attributed to route 
structure in recent years, point-to-point routes are 
typically not the defining characteristic ofLCCs. JetBlue, 
which, at least until its recent reversal, was cited as major 
factor in the transformation of the US domestic industry, 
is an excellent example. Its route structure incorporates 
significant portions of point-to-point, H&S, and linear 
concepts. In the midst of the industry financial crisis 
following 2001, many analysts would have agreed with 
Jay Brueckner of the University oflllinois who observed, 
"In the end, we'll see a mixture of low-cost, point-to-point 
airlines and network carriers that look a lot different." 
(Levins, 2004, BOl). This simple bifurcation now seems 
less likely. Low-cost-carriers, to the extent the term still 
has meaning, are evolving a complex blend of route 
structures and product while traditional legacy carriers 
simplify theirs.+ 
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